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Th.e taieme of tviis discussion is public easements. 3e-
fore discoursing wit. any degree of particularity upona tAis
special piase of tne subject, it migit be well and not in-
appropriate to view Vie entire field for an idea of tqe
underlying principles tiat govern all classes of easements.
The law on tqis important ranucl of jurisprudence may
be traced to te ancient civil law, down tirour'g te dif-
ferent stages of te common law, to tvie p-eseat time.
Its scope is broad,, affecting ric, landed interests
wnicA are frequent subjects of 1 itigation, and belovgs to
ti.at br-oad field k.own * real propeprty, as incorporeal.
ner i d i tame at s.
Civil commentators called it a praedial igit, and de-
fined it as " a privi1 ege tat oae .aeiglbor iati of anot-ier,
by writing or prescription wihiout profit, as a way or
siAk t-rou gi. -is lad, -or suc- like." (.o )
This was in early days, tn e accepted definition, hut
(1) Te~'ies de Ia Ley, p. 284.
4Aas since received te severest criticism and been abridged
and modified in many ways.
The statement t"lat a praedial rigAt, in modern law termed
an easement, is a "privilege given in writing by one meig'l-
bor to anotlqer" is manifestly incorrect, for at tiqe present
time sub.k an instrument would create only a simple license.
In order to be valid as an easement, it must be under seal.
An easement is an iaterest in realty, ad -no suci interest
can at present be disposed of but by a sealed instrument.
It is true tiat tiese rigIts are frequently acquired by
prescription, but ia every sucq instance a granL is presumed.
Goddard says:-"An easement is a privilege wit-out p-rofit,
wiicli tie owner of one tenement 4as a rigit to enjoy in
respect of Ltat tenement in. or over tte tenement of anotlier
person, by reason wtereof te latter is obliged to suffer.or
refrain from doing sometiing onu is own tenemeat for tie
advantage of Lte former." ()
In legal contemplation te rig-It of making use of tie
land of ot-qers, w1.etxer it be t at of tue public or of indi-
vidual]s, for a precise and definite purpose .not inconasistant
wit. a general .rig-it of property in tie owne.r, especiall.y
(L) 2oddard ona F asements, p. 2,.
5wlere it is for a public use, is an easemeqt. After a care-
ful sifting of defiiitioms and cases, tie essential requi-
sites of aa easement are t iese:-
First,-Tney ere ircorporeal.
Second,-They are imposed on coporeal property.
Thirdy,-- They confer ao rigqt to a participation in
tie profits arising from sus-i property.
Fourtn]y,-They are imposed for t,e beaefit of corpor-
eal property.
Fiftiily,-There must be two distinct tenemenats,-tie
domiaat to Wqici tqe rig1At belongs; aan tie servieat upon
w'iici tie obligation rests.
An easement is a mewe privilege to do a certain tiag,
no privilege can be corporeal-, tierefore I' easemeat must
be incorporeal. It must of necesLity be a burdea upon
someti.iag tangible or tie rigit itself could not. exist.
No profit can. be derived tierefrom, tae idea of an easement
being t. e acq isitioA of a psiviAee ei-t-.e; fo - co;venience
or from necessity, arid not for tie sake of personaa gain-
suci. would be termed a rig it of comxnot.
asements are not, except as to tiose in gross witc
are infrequent, mere persoal rigits, but rigiats that at-~
tac-i tiemselves to, and are a burde-a upon, tie property
itself, wiici would not be tie case unless tiel were for
6tie beaefit of te corporeal. estate. Two distinct tene-
ments must, exist or. tAere would be no foundation for tLe
rig,*it.•
An distinguisied from a license it may be said tAat tie
latter is an authority to do a particular act or ser~ieg of
acts upon aaotler's land, witiout possessing aay estate
t'ereim, wiile a claim for an easemeat must be founded upon
prescription or a grant by deed, for it is a permanent
interest in ano-tqe 4 s land. Licenses may be created by pa-
rol, and are strictly confined to tie original parties, and
can neitier operate for nor agitst tuLrd persoas, wiile all
*tese attributes are untrue as to easements.
In addition to easements proper, therp are certain
rigvts known as quasi easements, for instance, tie owner of-
land Aas constructed a way or draia over one portion of it
for tie beaefit of .anotAer portion, there iaving never -been
a separate ownersli of either tenemeat. It is oftea a
serious question as to wletier suci servitudes are easements
at al-l, aad if so, what tie teat really is. The courts have
wor&ed tie solution of te problem o te basis of w.et'ier
or not hue rigt so instituted is continuous or non-contin-
uous. If cots tiuous, as a general proposition, it will-
pass wit. a deed of Lie la.nd, visa versa witi t~xe latter,
7wkici requires words of sufficie-a-eimport to creatc a niew
tenemeat. (I)
Easemeats iv. ,"oss are of frequeit occureice in Ft" and
but rarely found in tAis couy.trY. They are rigits attacled
to tie realty but wlicA can be enjoyed by t ie party possess-
iag suci rigit. TAey are created by deed, and are so strict-
ly persoyja tiat~do not pass oy descent, aad cannot be as-
signed or tAe iaterest slaTed in amy way. If an easement is
created by deed tie servitude is never presumed to be per-
soaa1 or ia gross, if, by any reasonable coastruction, it can
be "ield appurteaant to some oter estate,* So decided
w'ere property was sold fronting oa a river and tie rigIt
was to use sucA premises for tile construction of a ware-
-iouse by ti.e grantor, is ieirs or assignes, was reserved
aad suci use by tle grantee, !.,is heirs o r as.sigaes was.-
projibited. Tis igimt was coustrued as appurtenaat to
tie laad itself, aiad biiding upona subsequeat purciasers
witA aotice. (2')
As a rule, wiere tie dominaat anad servieut tenements are
separate a4d distiAct es'ates, te term "appurteaaces" in
(1) Fetters V. Ium pi.reys, ( '9 N. J. Eq. 4rrA.
Pasona's v. Joi~hSOiq (68 N. Y. 62.)
(2) ! c M auon v. Williams, (79 Ala. 288.)
Kuecken v. Vo~tz, (UO] I'l. 264.)
8a deed of.cowtveyance will pass an easement. (1'
Aa, existing easement as a matter of eal ig.t, passes
with t.e hVing granted, wtetier tie words "witj appurten-
ances" are used in hie conveyance or not; but Vie use of Vie
words wil. not trasfer to tbe rantee an apparent easement
over laads belonging to another, iot necessarily attacied as
an appurtenance to tie lands conveyed, and to wiCei. e gran"
tor rias no title or rig.L. Tis doctrine is clearly eaun-
ciated int Gree v. Co17ins, (86 N. Y. 246.)
An easement will- sometimes be infer-Red from te nature
of te grant itself, and pass with te conveyance. W.ere
A resided on one tract of land aid rented anot-qer to B
w~o was permitted to run a drain hirougn A's portion into
a common sewer. Under tis statement of facts it was
ield tat, wiere A subsequently sells boti tracts to dif-
ferent persons o hVie same day, tiat tie riglt to continue
tie use of tie drain ceases, if, by reasonable expense and
labor, a new one can be constructed witnout crossing tat
land. (2)
In deciding t e Bur's cas .e court said, "It s oly
(1.) Parson 's v. Join~son, (68 N. Y. 62,675.)
(2) 'Burns v. Gallag~er, (62 lMd. 462.)
.... v.----, (112 Mass. 224.)
9in cases of strictest necessity, and were it would not be
reasoaable to suppose tat t'e parties intended tlte contrary,
tlat tqe priaciple of impled reservation can be invoked."
in Lampman v. M:ulks, (21 N. Y. 505t, te New Yorks court
voilently assailed tis doctrine. In te opinaaion it was
said, wvien tie owner of two tenements sells one of tiem,
te purctaser takes the tenement or portion sold with al tVie
t urdens and benefits wiic q appear, at Pie time of tie sale,
to belong to it, as between it and :t~ie property retained by
tA e vendo r."
Thqis latter view is more practical for no man will pur-
&iase property until ie ias carfully examined it, nor will a
grantor dispose of property, if 'te be a careful busintess man,
unless jie reserves to '1imself al'! apparent riglits and priv-
ileges, w1ici hie does not intend to convey. Some courts
criticise tis view because of its alleged broadness and
liberality of construction in be'lalf of tbhe g-antee, w'iile
easements of absolute necessity only are to be reseved to Lie
grantor. This view is evidently severely strained, for tie
burden of tie easemen.t is equall-y as .iable to fal.l upon Pie
estate of Pie grantee as upon h.at of hke grantor, neither
party 'iaving any material advantage.
VTere tPie easemenat is n ot created by some fo-rm of di-
rect grant eitger express or implied, it may in rare cases
be obtained by necessity, as where a circle of lots surrounds
certain other property so completely tat no mode of ingress
and egress can conveniently be i.had. In sucb. cases t ie outer
Ienements will be burdened by an easement, for a reasonable
'assageway in favor of the surrounded estate.
Another class of easements not acquired by direct grant
are those obtained by prescription; the open, notorious,
peaceful and adverse occupation of the premisee under claim of
right for a period of years being the essential requisites. (I
And in his connection it may be said that no easement by the
public can be acquired by tb.is means, for a prescriptive rigiat
presupposes a grant, and tb.e case of the public there can be
no grantee. (2)
Some jurisdictions assert neverthaeless that the public
may acquire suc'i prescriptive rights, the theory of a "pre-
supposed grant" being purely fictional. T)i.ese courts
maintain that he public A.ave an easement by estoppel. Tiis
view is ably set forth in Committee v. Case, ( 26 Pa. St..117
and other cases. (3)
(I) Ward v. Warren, 82 N.Y. 265; 60 Vt. 74.
(2) Pearsall v. Post 20 Wend. ( N.Y. ) 121.
(:3) Martin v. People, 23 IlI. 395.
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The case of Odiorne v Wade ( 5 Pic-. 421), was an actioLz
for trespass, quare claasum fregit, the defendant Aaving
put in a plea of common A-igb way from time immemorial, and
proved the existence of the way for more tian sixty years
tiere being no evidence stowing its commencement, tVe court
held t'lie duration of the way was sufficient to support tie
plea of prescription, and in Reed v. Nortifield, 13 Pick.
94, Obheif Justice Shaw said, "We tink it clear upon prin-
ciple that public easements, as well as others, may be sIhown
by long and uninterrupted use and enjoyment, upon the ex-
elusive legal presumption from sucA enjoyment, that they
were, at some antlerion. period, laid out and establised by
competent autiority." (1)
ButAvery able argument of Senator Furman in Pearsall v.
Post makes the oter, and probably te better view, of Vlis
subject, plain. Speaking of he law cn New York %ie says,
" and as it Aas in substance existed ever since the formation
of our Constitution, he only way tbhat an individual can
acquire a rig'it in real es-tate is by grant, or by an adverse
lart v. Trustees, l5 Id. 226,
Odiorne v. Wade, 5 Pick . 421.
(1) Brownell v. Palmer, 22 Conn. 107,
State v. (-teen. 41 Iowa 693.
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possession# of twenty years under a claim of title, in whic-v.
case the law presumes a grant; and as to the public, t~e
only way in wtic'i tiey can at common law acquire an ease-
ment in tqe land of another is by dedication."
Land, itc is generally conceded, must be conveyed by
some form of grant, thiat grant must ordinarily be in writing
and under seal, from a definite grantor to a definite gran-
tee. As a matter of fact low, in this case, can suct t7a
sealed instrument even be implied for te public is but an
indefinite, ficti*ious term applied to tie body politic
wVo are tbus incapable of receiving it ? The remedy should
be by statute, making all lligliways &c. tiat Aaveopen to tie
public for a certain period vest an easement in the public
by dedication. Suc is tie present policy in lNew York. (1)
In various othIer States similar statutes liave since been
enacted.•
A word may now be said as to tie subject of party walls,
and tqe rigbt to lateral and subjacient support of land.
The former are supposed usually to be of common benefit to
bot. estates in t.e construction of buildings tiereon, but
t~ey are not of necessity estates in comm.on. If they are
built by agreement for t~ieir common use, or iave been used
(1) 1 1 . Y. R ev. Stats. 521, Sec. 100, (3rd.Ed. 636
Sec. 120.)
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jointly tor twenty years, thiey become such an estate,
which cannot be removed or impaired by one to the detriment
of the other. But such walls are frequently owned in
severalty by the parties ofn whose lands it stands. Eitier
may use the wall for all purposes not 2tnconsistant with the
rigAts of the other. (1
The right to subjacent support of land is a subject that
applies with equal force to both,,and private easements.
The public in working the streets and private individuals
in improving their premises cannot deprive an adjacent owner
of the natural support of the land to his detriment. (21
But only reasonble precautions need be taken, and if
the injured party has inadvertently built too close to the
line, he cannot recover damages in case of loss, to an
extent greater than those sustained as the natural and
probable consequence of the act. (3)
(1) Brooks v. Curtiss, 50 N. Y. 631.
5 Taunton 20.
(2) Beard V. Murphy, 37 Vt. 104
Milburn v. Fowler, 27 Jun (N4. Y. ) 568.
(3) Charles v. 3.ankin, 22 1,o. 556.
Farrand v. Marshall, 21 Parb. (N. Y.) 40g.
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T.is same righit is extended to canals and, railroads, and
ite owner adjoining must not dig so as to injure tem . (I
Lateral support of Aouses is strictly an artificial ease-
ment, and can be created only by grant or prescription.
The term of tie grant must be strictly complied witi, and
tqe adjacent structures reasonably protected. (2)
flaving given a brief sketc. of te underlying princi-
ples of tbhe entire subject, it will now be possible to
better comprehend tAe scope and meaning of te term public
easements.
As te name implies tey are rights 'Ield by tie entire
body politic in contr44ention to tose claimed by private
individuals. It is possible for a private individual and
t'e public to have distinct easements in tqe same t"airg,
as wvere A ltas a rigAt by deed to lay pipes underneat-i
property w1 ic i )tas since been dedicated to a city for a
public park.
Public rights are always paramount, it being considered
wise at all times to sacrifice private good% for tie general
welfare. It may be said tnlat public easements are all tie
righits in property 'aeld by t~ie governing body. in trust,
Ci) Midiand { . 3. v. C~ieckiey, L. 3. 4 Eq. 20.
(2) OCarles v. 3 ankin, 22 IMo. 556.
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in such a way tiat Vie public s1lall derive te greatest
benefit t~'erefrom, so long as tie foresigtt of thiat govern-
ing body sliall deem suchi possession necessary for tie
fullest realization of the object originally contemplated.
The main objects of suchi easements are ways, water courses
and tlie incidents thereto. The public may acquire an int-
erest in land by dedication; in some States by prescription;
and in all States by tqe exercise of tiqe rightt of eminent
domain.
Dedication may be either by statute or in pais. As
to just what tie requisites of a dedication are the States
are in conflict. Some are very liberal on tb.e question and
require only an intent to dedicate, anLa pulblic use to whichA
it mal be applied. The dedication is oftentimes implied
from the nature of t-te act. It mat be in writing or ver-
bal; express or implied; a single act or a serries of acts
clearly manifesting t e owner's intent. (1) But the offer
must be accepted and in most of L"te States, it must be
formnally done by come public official, or person witi. author-
ity to act, and will not usually be implied. In Texas an%
Alabama, an acceptance may be s~town by some post ive conduct
(1) 9 k~ew York 256.
4Southern ( Ala. ) 153.
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of public officials evincing their consent in behalf of tle
public, or inferred from official acts of implied recognit-
ion on thLeir part, or by any public use, or from tAe befle-
ficial nature of tb.e dedication. (I)
In t)ie State of Michiigan tie dedicatory instrument
must be unde'r seal, r.ust definitely describe te property,
its measurements and boun ,s, and be duly acknowledged or
it will fail. In New York te easement tieory of dedication
prevails. ( )
By this theory te State may use property, unmolested,
for twenty years and by statute it will be tien be 'held to have
been dedicated to its use. But mere failure to assert the
title is not a dedication. (3)
At common law tite intent to dedicate was te essential
feature, under this system tqe legal title remained in te
grantor, yet ie was estopped from setting it up aginst those
vwo were using it in compliance with tie O(edicatory agreen
ment. (4)
(1) 4 Sout"hern (Ala. 415.
6Souti. Western, (Texas) 860.
(2) 9 l~ew York 256.
(3) 18 l~ort'i. Eastern (Ill.) 298.
(4) 41 lorti. Western (Minn.) 1045.
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The States holding that te public may acquire prescrip-
tive righqts, are not numerous, Illinois, assac lusetts, Con-
necticut and Delaware being tie leading exponents of this
tVieory•
The next and probably the most important method of all
is tlihe exercise of the righit of eminent domain. Tis right
is said by some autqor6i to exist in the nature of power
reserved by te State to use whatever property it may subse-
quently deem necessary for he convenience of tA.e public.
By ot~qers it is said to be, not a reservation at all, but
purely and simply a matter of rig-nt. As to wtict view is
correct, is, so far as t-Ais discussion is concerned, of lit-
tle consequence, so long as bot. parties concede, as a ma-
jor proposition tiat tqie righIt itself exists. The legislature
is primarily vested with te exercise of this important
function, but may and frequently does delegate its authority
to municipalities, and local governments. re righi-t may
be exercised in all cases in whichi tte publie as a whole are
directly or indirectly benefitted. And the fact that its
effect in a particular case is mainly local, will mar:e no
difference, if Pie general public are effected favorably in
any way.
In Talbot v. Iudson,(16 Gray424 .), h'e court said," It
as never been deemed essential t~.at the entire community,
18
or any considerable portion thereof shLould directly enjoy
or participate in an improvement or enterprise in 
order to
constitute a public use within tq.e true meaning of tAese
words as used in te Constitution. In a broad and compre-
-ikensive view such as 'qas Aeretofore been taken of te Dec-
laration of igits, every tqing wiich tends to enlarge tAe
resources, increase -t-e industrial energies and promote tb.e
productive power of any considerable number of t'le inhabi-
tants of a section of te State or Wiic. leads tot ie gr,?i of
towns and tlie creation of naw *sources of employment of
private capital and labor, indirectly contributes to tl'ie gener-e
al welfare and to t.e prosperity of tAe whole community."
VWhien public interests cannot be conveniently subserved
witiout te use of private property, it may be condemned and
taken for suc4 use. And, not olxy may tie land itself be
acquired where tie necessity exists, but, as in cases of
railroads, all materials needed for its constuction may be
I
taken, if such condemnation is deemed essential to the en-
joyment of the former right. (1)
In connection with the ri ht of eminent domain and ded-
ication the subjects most directly affected, and in which the
public have more vital interests than in all ot~ers combined,
(1! L -un (n. Y.) 4.96
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are those of lands and, water-ways.
That people must Aave means of intercourse without as-
I
suming te position of trespassers is clearly apparent, nor
can th.is vital que. tion be left for individual-s to determine
at their option. Cummunication between individuals, and
States, and between Lbpe natins of t'ie world demands, for its
quiet and, peaceful enjoyment, that certain prescribed ways
shlall be laid out and vest in tbe people as common property.
So far as water courses of tVe country are concerned, it is
d
tie rule tiat if non-navigable, tie riparian owner possesses
the fee to tiqe center of tie stream, and hias te right to its
natural flow unadulterated. But if for any reason t'le pub-
lie will be materially benefitted by its use, it may be con-
demned for tiat purpose. But tie use must be public in its
nature. The leading case in wbqichi tie authority of tvle
State was overreacbhed is Smit' v. The City of 'oc 1 ,ester. In
tis case tle city was by State permit allowed to Oraw water
for city use from T4nbock lake, w1iic1 so diminishied Vt, flow
of its outlet that a mill owner situated tiereon was serious-
lY damaged. The city wae hield in damages to t e extent of
the loss. (1)
The stream may be used by riparia'n owners in any way
(1) Smith v. The City of .lociester, 92 N. Y. 463.
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not inconsistent wiyh te interests of tose above or below
tiem. One cannot erect a dam' whtic1. will cause tie water to
set back upon .is neighbor, nor can -e erect suchi 9am and di-
vert tie water into otier channels for purposes of irrigation.
Unless,- tVe stream be returned to its original 
ciqannel, be-
fore leaving L'ie premises, materially undiminised.. (1)
Nor can tle water be applied to a use whict will so
pollute it as to render it unfit for common use. (3)
But it is in the larger, navigable waterways tiat the publif
are more deeply interested and in wich tie separation of
public from private rigA.ts is difficult to determine.
Tie public Aas dominion over sucA streams to tkie
iig water mark, and posseses tie fee to ti-e soil underly,%
ing,. (3)
If Vie public interfereq witi tie righits of owners of
private streams, or takes property for Vie purpose of improv-
ing navigation in public wnters, it is a taking for a pub-
lic use and must be compensated for. (4)
(1) Clark v. Penn!a. ;. I . Co. 105 Pa. St. 438.
(2,) Ferguson v. Firmenich1 i\fg. Co. 77 Iowa 576.
(3) In re petition of U. S. 96 14. Y. 22'7,
Barney v. Keokukq 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 324.
( ) Morgan v. King, 351N Y 454,
Walker v. Board of Pub. Works 163 Oaio 540.
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But as to wien private property hlas been taken is thie
knotty problem, for some States accord to adjoining owners
greater privileges and property righ.ts t-lan others, wiichi
bias given rise to thiis difficulty. In te following cases
it was held tat te riparian-owners on-navigable streams
could obtain compensation for any individual act viicki mater-
ially injured a legitimate use to wiuic they were putting
t'qe stream. (1)
In tq.e Missouri case Meyers was a riparian propriator
on a navigable stream, and used tbat part of it whic ad-
joined his premise- for boating and shiipping purposes.
The City of St. Louis ran a dike out into tb. river just
(1) Smiti v. Tie City of aochester, 92 N. Y. 463,
125 New York, 164,
Heyers v. The City of St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 510 Wall47,
31 Minn. 297,
Stearns v. Patterson & Newark R. . Co.. 34 N.J.L.532
22 West Virginia 52,
contra: -
Gould v -udson .iver %.A. Co. 6 N.Y. 526.
91 Illinois 508, 29 Miss. 21.
112 Massachusetts 334.
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above *im, whicA caused sand and mud to collect in large
quantities in front of iis land to "'iis detriment.
The Court accorded damages on tie t .teory tiqat *e Aad a
vested property right in the stream wiicb. could not be des-
troyed without compensation. In its opinion te court said,
" The right of the owner of a lot in town to te use of the
adjoining street is declared to be as mucA property as the
lot itself, and it is immaterial whether he owns to the
middle of te street or not. So, tie right of a reparian
propriator to the flow of the water in front of Iiis lot
is as much property as tAe lot itself, and it is ifmmaterial
that he doe not own to the middle of the stream. It is
impossible to see wiy the property can be taken in one case
and not in the other." By a public use of waterways is
not meant that exercise by State authority alone, the rule
being firmly establisqed tiat tie Federal Governme3t as well
may use such. courses in any manner that will bes't conform
to the Nation's good, without fear of molestation or inter-
ferance on the part of te State. (1)
(1) M 0iss. R. Bridg e Co. v Lonergan, 91 111 . 5C9,
Gilman v Philadelphia, 70 U. S. (3 Wall) 713,
Stockton v Baltimore %.,R. C~o. i I Interstate Com-
merce %ep. 411',
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And it is well understood Viat tLe right of Vie State
and National govermnents to keep navigable waters open is
not tAe full extent of tvieir power. They may erect and
maintain suitable ligbt-houses; docks and wiarver; and other
conveniences tqat tend to facilitate navigation and conrerce.
Co-extensive Wit-q tqis righIt reposed in Vie State to main-
tain its navigable waterways, is Vie rigiqt to establisli and
maintain ways upon land for tqe convenience of the public.
WitAout suc- t1'iouroug'Ifares intercommunication could not ]5e,
for public interests would be made subservient to individual
rights. In thiis, as in all otb er cases in w iict public and
private intere ts are intermingled, tie dividing line is un-
certain and difficult to establis~h.
In some ilmstances private individuals, w.ose property
abutts upon a way, retain te fee to te road bed, granting
1 1 state only an easement, te property being "held in trust
for Lbe public wio must use it for the purposo of a higkl-
way only.
In otrier c-ases Vie fee is in the State, tie adjoining
owner retaining Vie easement rigt, under w.icd i.e may in-
sist t.tat it shiall be used only for Vie purposes originally
intended in he dedicaLory~ aL:e :t.Al,. As to wi.at constitutes
a proper use of a 1iigk-way is a mooted question. Some juris
dictions iold tiat all modern contrivances and inventions bein -
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great facilitators of commerce and travel, come properly
within tgis grant, while ot.ers say t}iey are an extra burden
upon tie fee, not wit?_in tie contemplation of tiie parties
when the original agreement was made. Litigation over such
additional uses are of frequent occurrence, arising over
steam, electric and elevated railways; electric ligit and
gas plants; telegrapqs and telep-ones; sewers, water-mains,
and similar purposes to wiicA public tourougifares, are put.
First, as to thiose cases in whicq. the fee to the street or
way is nAn tb-e adjoining owner, it may be said tiat all are,
generally speaking considered an additional burden upon tie
fee. They are all in their nature more or less permanent,
and tie State Aaving only a righit of way veR'ted in itself,
cannot force the fee-holder to submit to permanent burdens
not provided for, witout te payment of a fair compensation.(/)
In speaking of the use of steam railroads in such tour-
ougqfares, tie court in Williatas v 1. Y. C. .R . Co. said:-
"The rigit of the publicb in a kiigkiway is an easerment and
one that is vested in.tAe Wole public. Is not the rigt
of the railroad company to build its tracks on the high-
way al so an easement?
16 Fed. 444; 67 III. 439.
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This cannot can be denied, not tAat the latter easement is
enjoyed not by tie public but by a corporation; because it
will not be pretended tiat every man would ave tie rig-it to
go and lay down 'is Limbers and Ais iron rails, and ma.e a
railroad upon a 'nig way. lere tere are two easements;
I
one vested in te public and tIe othier in tbhe railroad com-
pany. Thaese easements are property and tat of Lqe rail-
road company is valueable. 'low was it acquired ? It cost
tie company noting.. The thieory must be that it was carved
out of a part of' t2e public easement, and is t'herefore a
gift of the public. This would do if it were given solely
at the expense of the public. But it is manifest that it is
the joint expense of the public and the owner of the fee.
oug. t not tie latter, then, to hiave been consulted 7" But
if public pasage and re-passage is not nindered or impeded,
it 'ias been ield tiat The use of a street for railroad pur-
poses is not a perversion of t',e original idea of a street.(l)
And even Wtere it Aas been interferxed with, some
States refuse damages on tqe ground Lbhat it is not a new or
different use of the streets, but merely a new use of the
easgemenlt already granted. (2)
(1) 10 Barbour (N.Y.) 36 0.
(2) Cleveland .:3. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325.
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It ' ias also been decided thtat a railroad company wit. a
permit to use t'e streets cannot monopol ize tviem to tLte ex-
clusion of the public or private uses to wViic tIey are be-
in applied. (I)
And if tie adjoining owner can sow special damages
not suffered in common wita ot.hers, as obstructions affecting
access to pretises, bhe may recover t~iem regardless of te
ownership of t2e fee. This doctrine is fundamental in all
States. Enunciated in the following, cases. (2)
The rig'its of individuals in streets of w'tich they are
tie fee owners are evidently, and of rig.t oug.t to be, muchi
greater t'lan tiose in w1tic the fee is vested in t'lie public,
for in one case thie original owner Aas received a fair re-
muneration at te outset, and injuries, subsequently sus-
tained, mig'tt be considered consequential, or an incident
to tte grant, w hile in tie ot'ter, tqe fee hias beem retained
under individual control, in every way not inconsistent
witq tbe rigt vested in tte public. In case tie fee Aas
been disposed of, does suc-i. disposition divest te grantor of
all rig',.ts Wiatsoever in thqe property, particularly Ven trie
fee is in t1,e public, and wien private righits retained are
to be injured by some use to wbhichi tie public interest is to
be put ? This question was ably diecussed in (51 N. 1. 504 2
(1) 7 m.47.....2 Stone v. Fairbury, 68 111. 394.
106 Ill. 511.... Jewett v. Union -. Oo. 15 kt {ep. 818.
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The court said .- "ln a strict legal sense, land is not prop-
erty. T'he term property, althougq in common parlance fre-
quently applied to land or a cbattel, in its legal signifi-
cation means only the rigts of the owner in relation to it.
If property consists of certain Otssenttial rights and a
phiysical interference wit-. land substantially subverts one
of those rig Ihts, such interference takes pro tanto the own-
er's property. The right of indefinite user is an essential
attribute or quality of absolute property without wiic' ab-
solute property can have no existance.# From tqe very nat-
ure of tese rigits of user and exclusion it is evident that
AVtat tey cannot be materially abridged witout ipso facto
taking its owners property." This view has since been cited
with approval in many jurisdictions, so hiat the applications
of the rule is ie objective point in view.
It may safely be said tat, Vie consensus of opinion
is that wilethier tae infringement be in the nature of an
electric, steam, Aorse or other railroad, tie use of the
streets for suci purposes is a legitimate one, and is not a
furtier burden on tie fee. Tas main exception to tis
iolding is the S3tate of L ew York, wh'ich h'olds suchi use legit-
imate, if t~e railroad is constructed upon tvte surface of
Pie street without c. ange of grade. In suci. instances it i
viewed as an appropriation to a public use wic does not
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constitute a taking of private property. (1)
It must be understood thaat w'en land is laid out for a
way, regardless of the ownership of the fee, that it must be
used for that specific purpose alone. The State has no au-
thority to condemn tAe property of one individual for the
benefir of another, but in addition thereto a definite pub-
lic benefit must be shown. But on the other hand the domi-
nant owner must be allowed to enjoy his easement in suc i a
manner as will secure to 'im all t'ie advantages contemplated
by tae grant. (2)
That the right to manipulate public streets and ighs-
ways of large cities and towns for uses like tose of the
telegrapq and telepqone, electric plants, and elevated and
other, railroads is a valuuable franchqise, cannot be ques-
tioned. Suclh francqises are practically exclusive, and
net their proprietors millions of dollars yearly. TAis
immense profit is reaped from the fares charged to abutting
owners and to other #travelers alike. The State is deriving
no special benefit by way of taxes or otherwise, for the
money invested would be subject to taxato% any way. The
(I) 121 1~ew York, 505.
(2) Noyes v. -lemphill, 58 1 . -I. 538.
Shivers v. Shivers, 32 I~ew Jersey Equity, 578.
Williams v. Safford, 7 Barbourd, (h. Yo) 3QQ.
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main good accomplis~ed is tiat greater conveniences are offer-
ed to travelers and business men trian could be otherwise
attained. ut if tvIese additional conveniences are paid
for in fares wiy should not thteyi.e. abutting owners be
compensated to t.qe extent of their loss resulting from tbhe
grant of thqe franchiise ? Of course tqe injury in eachi case
cannot be te same, for a steam or elevated railway in a
large city is a muc'. greater burden tbqan a gas or water
main could possibly be. But that t'iere is actual damage
to a greater or less Oegree, in each case, can, it seems,
be easily maintained. So that as a matter of principle,
nominal damnges ought to be accorded in every instance, and
suc further damages as could be proven in eac^i particular
vase.
The majority of States do not support tiis teory, but
it is th'e fundamental baw of New York and a few oti.er juris-
dictions, and is evidently te more equitable policy to pur-
sue .
In harmony witA thte subject of street railways, comes Le
subject of elevated roads. These latter are erected at a
a'eigzt of twenty or twenty-five feet above the base of tie
street. and operations are carried on free from tiae busy
throng below, enabling ti!e city to iave rapid transit.
These roads are modern inventions, and being erected
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directly in front of the business places and residences of
adjoining street owners, necessarily causeg t.e inmates more
or less inconvenience from gas, steam, cinders, and te ob-
struction of 1igiat and air. Thisi coupled witA tAe noise
and disturbance occassioned by passing cars is exceedingly
annoying. Upon thqe construction of tie roads, abutting
owners were not long in recognizing t eir grtvvances, and
brought action to restrain the companie' from furt,.er use of
tVie streets, until the damages sustained Aad been paid.
Two classes of actions arose; one, Wlere tLbe fee was in the
abutting ownier, te otier, were ir was in tie city. WViere
tie abutting owner 'Ield it, the road was almost universally
considered an additional burden. (I
Wien Vie fee was in te city, it was asked What rigbt
tese adjoining owners Aad to claim damages to property,
wVen tiey 4ad parted, and been once adequately remunerated
a
for the loss of te fee? Upon tqs tIeory tie majority of
te court at first, refused compensation, claiming the
(1) story v N. Y. Elev. ". Co. 90 N. Y. l22,
(hicago v Fev. }{. Co. 75 Ill. 74,
Aa'ion v N. Y. C. & 1. 3, . {*. Co. 24 N.Y. 658.
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damages were purely consequential. (1)
But, upon due reflection and the addition of special
Constitutional provisions 6n several States, the holding
fnow is, with two or three exceptions, tiqat damages will be
accorded in any case where they can be proven.
It is now well settled that abutting owners have pro-
perty rights in the street, even though they have been strip-
ped of the fee. For, they permitted it to be taken for
one specific purpose o ny namely,-5 that of a highway.
And, if the street be put to uses not strictly such, the
easalant retained is such a property interest as rill, if
(1) City of T3teading v Althouse, 93 Pa. St. 400,
Market St. . Co. v 0.C.0o. 51 Cal. 503,
People v. Verr, 27 N. Y. 188,
e.2 Connecticut 74,
125 Massaciusetts 515,
14 Ohio St. 523,
fon tra:
7/4 Indiana 29,
60 Iowa 740,
47 ichigan 393.
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lost, entitle them to a compensation. (1)
The adjoining owner on a street *.as a rigqt to demand
the free passage of lighit and air to Ais premises.
Structures erected in mid- air like elevated railways, tele-
I
graphis, telephones &c. are an impairment of this easement.
Streets are usually coastructed before buildins are erected.
So thiat, from tie instant tqe structure is raised, thiis ease-
ment will immediately attachi. frmm thie nature of tqe use. (2)
This is true oxly as to ligit and air passing over
public tiourou_'tfarex, and does not relate to prescriptive
righv~ts claimed from long user over tqe adjacient lots of
private individuals. This theory commonly known as tie
doctrine of "ancient lighqts, is still in full force in Ekg-
land, but nearly obsolete in t iicountry.
Those States h1iolding tiat tie easement of ancient lights
() Abe ntortA v. Maa i.4tai El. . Co., 122 I. Y. 1,
La~.r v. Met. El. F. Co., I04 11. Ye 268,
125 New York 164,
29 rMIIansOnta 41.,
f lNew Jersey Law 592,
Am. Prim. Meti.. Soc..v. Brooklyn El. R.. Co. 46 jun 530
(2) 125 Nlew York 164,
104 Niew York 268.
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cannot be prescribed for, are, Alabama, Connecticut, Geor-
gia, Iowa, Indiant Maine, M1aryland, Massachusettsq, Eew York,
O'iio, Pennsylvania, South. Carolina, Texas, Wec-t Virginia
and Vermont. Those hiolding adversely are, Illinois, Louis4F
ana and New Jersey.
Of t'is doctrine in brief, judge Bronson says, "There
is, I think, no principle upontie modern English doctrine
on Uie subject of ligtts can be supported. It is an anomaly
i-n Vhe law. It may do well enoughi in England, and I see it
,ias oecentlJ' been sanctioned witkt some qualifications by an
act of Paflinlclt; but it cannot be applied in growing cities
and villages in thais country, witv.out wor.,ring tVe most mis-
c61ievous consequences."1
The decisions on tie question of wiether the erection of
telegraph and telep-ione poles in a public street or Aighway
is an additiomal servitude for wkici te abutting owner
ougt to be paid, are not unanimous. Massachusetts -olds
t'iat no additional burden is imposed. (I)
In its opinion tqe court said, "The discovery of tie
telegraph developed a new and valuable mode of communicating
intelligence. Its use is certainly similar to, iP not
indentical wit~i, that public use of transmitting!: information
(I) Pierce v. Dren, 136 IMass. 75.
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for wN'tic-. tqt ighway was originally taken, even if the
means adopted are quite different from the post-boy or the &a
mail-coach. It is a newly discovered method of exercising
the old Public easement, and all appropriate metiods must
be deemed to nave been paid for when the road was laid out.l)
In this same case, Pierce v Drei4 a strong dissenting
element existed, whose sentiments voice those of nearly.her
State. The following is a concise statement of their opin-
ion, -- " The use of a highway for telegraphic purpose is not
naturally included in the original design,1arnaturally in,
cidental to its use for tlavel. ?igiways can be and are
conviently used wit1gout telegrapI or telephones. The
latter can be ertablise1 without the use of the h'ighway.
It may be convienent in many instancee to use it for elec-
trical lines, but whenever tLis proves to be the case, there
is no hardsbqip, in requiring those who wish tV establish such
lines to pay for the privilege such damages, if any, as may
haVe been occassioned byy such use. In many instances, no
doubL, there will be no damage. But in cases wlere actual
damage is thqus caused, tiere is no good reason why it should
(1) 14 Gray (},Mass.2 540.
People v. Eaton, 59 1 . W. (Mich.) 145.
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not be paid for byttA-ose W1o will derive te benefit. It
is more just and reasonable tiat suchi payments shiould be
made by an additional use or servitude, tian to hiold te
loss to iave been included at t~ie outset, wven it was not
known wietbier such use would be required or not." (1)
Among Vie othier uses to wiicA public ways are frequently
put are tIose of sewers, drains, gas and water mains &c..
Of tiese, and similar uses in general it may be said tiat
t",ey differ materially in many respects from railways and tel-
egraphs, in tiat tey are of more direct benefit to Vie abut
ting owner.
Gas and oVer lights are necessary for the facilitation of
travel; sewers and drains for maintaining- tie ealtq of tbie
city; water mains for supplying water for public and private
consumption, and in avertingconflagrations.
These conveniences are often44e-s perfected by tqe city
officials Viemselves, and if not, are usually subject to
tkeir immediate control. The advantage to property owners is
(1) Dusenbury v. ,M ut. Tel. oo. 11 Abb. I.. 440.
At. & Pac. Tel .o. v. (Ta icago hI"..&Pac.R.4o. 6 Bis.15
107 Ill • 507.
24 1ew York ,sup. 10L.
19 Kansas 517. Board of Works for Vadsworti. Dist.
v. Uniten Kingdom Tel Co. Ld. 51 Law Times lep. 148.
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so apparent, t iat are oftimes by special statute, taxed for
tte expense of construction. (*
But if any abutting owner can sqow special damage in
any of t'ese cases, a reasonable compensation will be allow-
ed. (2)
In case of an infringement upon easement rights two rem-
K!edies will lie. An action at law for trespass may be invo-
ke-e, and all damages up to the time of commencing suit assess-
ed, or, proceedings in equity may be instituted, for an
injunction to restrain te trespassers from committing fur-
ther injury, and for a judgment for te injuries already
inflicted, or liable to be sustained. Tis equitable remedy
is te more frequently invoked, for by it prospective dama-
ges, or damages in futuro may be awarded, and a multipli-
city of suits avoided. At law damages are confined strictly
to those suffered previous to tie institution of t-te suit.
In assessing damages in cases were tie act "ias resulted inju-
riously in certain ways and benicially in otiers, t-e courts
(1) 128 1Eew York, 55.
Pierce vl. R rew, 13 h Mass. 87.
2 Dillon on ? un. Corps. 188.
(2) In %e loomfield & '3.Iat. 2asliFg.t Co. V.Calm ins
62 N . Y. 386.
Stearling's App. 111 Pa. 8t. 35.
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have allowed suif injuries and benefits to be balanced against
each other in determining the final result, But it is
.Iield, even thouVh the plaintiff vas suffered no injury w~iat-
ever, that ie may recover nominal damages for tqe loss or
impairment of his easement. This condition of affairs was
prominent ifL the Elevated R. . Cases, in Which the value of
private property had oftimes become enqanced by the construc-%
tionof thte road. The measure of datages used in these in-
stances, as a result of the impairment of ttetmsement of
light, air and accessem was the " value of the pro-nerty with-
out the road and with it." (I)
This same rule applfies to telegraphs, telephones and
surface railways as well as elevated roads.
As a fitting attribute to these remarks, one more sub-
ject must be briefly outlined, viz:- Th.e node of destroying
or extinguishing easements. The characteristics and inci-
dents of the ripht; the method of creating or acquiring it;
the rights and liabilities attending it; the extent and
mode of use having eac in turn been discussed. ertain
general rules g;overn the loss of these rights, wVpther vested
Newman v. M!et El. . Co. 118 1N. Y. 618,
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in pcivate individuals or in t'ie public, wriic'. are embraced
in tiree propositions. The first is by a release from the
owner of tqe dominant estate, and may be eitier by deed or
parol, but if by tl.e latter t1.e statements made must be
clearly indicative of an intent to Cerminate tie rigqt. (I
The second metiod is by a merger of tte two e-,tates under
the same title; as in case of a private individual, if A
ias an easement over tqe land of B and subsequently pur-
Chases 'Ve servient estate, ihe easement rightt will merge
in Vie fee. (2) But in order to make Vie merger complete
the title to each estate must be co-extensive. (3)
Thirdly by abandonment, w iicb. will be presumed if tie
dominant owner permits tie servient owner to do acts inconsis-
tent wit. qis use of tqe privilege.(4)
(1) Ballard v Butler, 30Mne. 94,
Pope v O'{ara, 48 N. y. 446,
'lamilton v Foster, 128 Mass. 492.
(2) Warren v Blake, 54 Ile. 27R,
2.Ppenn' a.St 43e& 7.
76 1orti Carolina 57.
(3) Kitger v Parker, 8 Ousi.. (Mass.) 145,
(4) T2 i~r v lampton, 4 McLord ( S.c.) 6a.
53 1lew York 622.
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Tt will always be presumed from non-user for a period
sufficient to create the rig-qt by prescription, where sucA
rightt was originally created in any way but by deed. (.)
The cessation of travel on a 'Aigqway, for six years, if vol-
untary, will amount to an abandonment. (2)
It 'tas been te aim of tis discourse to give a perspec-
tive view of tlie entire subject of easements, laying special
stress upon tbose of a public nature. The New York law )ias
been chaosen.as aut'ority whienever equally applicable. But
in cases of a divergence in opinion, conflicting views 'tave
frequently been state, 1oping by this means to give a com-
cise treatise, w'tich sall embrace principles sustained by
decisions covering, at least the more important fields of the
1 aw.
lewton J. Cunmings, L L. B.
C. U. L. S. 1 H, 9 5.
East Clarence, N. Y.
(1) Jewett v. Jewett, 16 Barb. (Ne. Y. ) 150,
Day v. Walden, 4o Mich. 575,
Eddy v. Chase, 140 Mass. 471.
(2) 1 N .Y. %. 8. 520, sec. 99.

